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Note 
 
Getting Back to Basics: Recognizing and 
Understanding the Swing Voter on the Supreme 
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Justice Anthony Kennedy, depicted in Matt Bors’ cartoon, 
Swing Vote Secrets: Inside the Mind of Justice Kennedy,1 has 
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 1. Matt Bors, Swing Vote Secrets: Inside the Mind of Justice Kennedy, 
DAILY KOS (May 13, 2015), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/5/13/1384273/ 
-cartoon-swing-vote-secrets. 
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been labeled the swing voter of the Supreme Court since the 
departure of his colleague Sandra Day O’Connor.2 Before 
O’Connor, Justices Byron White and Lewis Powell were the 
Supreme Court’s swing voters in the 1970s.3 And even earlier, 
Justice Forman Reed carried the swing vote mantle.4 
It goes without saying that swing voters have a long and 
storied history on the Court. But what does the term actually 
mean? There is an extensive history and tradition of labeling 
Supreme Court Justices as “swing” Justices.5 And yet the con-
tent of this label remains unclear. Some use the terms to con-
vey a negative sentiment. Bors’ cartoon is a prime example of 
this, insinuating that Kennedy used comical sources such as 
tealeaves, daisies, Internet message boards, and a Magic 8 Ball 
to decide his vote in seminal cases.6 Others suggest that being a 
swing voter or swing Justice is undesirable by using words like 
“wishy-washy” or even weak.7 At the same time, some use the 
terms more positively, focusing on the power one person can 
have to change law, policy, and even history.8 Complicating 
 
 2. See id.; see also Emily Bazelon, Swing Your Partner: O’Connor Versus 
Kennedy as the Justice in the Middle, SLATE (June 20, 2008), http://www.slate 
.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2008/06/swing_your_partner 
.html (characterizing Kennedy as “a swinger who knows how to be in a long-
term relationship” and O’Connor as “a bit of a tease” (emphasis added)). 
 3. See infra Part II.B. 
 4. Justice Reed was actually called a “swingman”—likely a hybrid role of 
the swing Justice and median Justice if viewed in modern terms. For a discus-
sion of this, see infra Part II.A. 
 5. These types of actors emerge in marginal cases or cases that address 
socially divisive issues. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 84–85 (2007) (“What’s 
the most important law at the Supreme Court? . . . ‘Five! The law of five! With 
five votes, you can do anything around here!’” (quoting Justice Brennan)). 
 6. Bors, supra note 1; see also Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015); 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 7. Antonin Scalia, Senior Assoc. Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Re-
marks at the 2015 Stein Lecture (Oct. 20, 2015) (answering a question about 
the swing voter, Justice Scalia replied, “[i]t doesn’t seem to me to be leading 
the Court but following the Court. I don’t know why anyone would aspire to 
that”) (notes on file with author); see B. Drummond Ayers, Jr., The ‘Swing’ 
Justice: Byron Raymond White, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1972, at 16. It has also 
jokingly been suggested that O’Connor used a Magic 8 Ball to make decisions. 
See Jim Huber, On Sandra Day O’Connor’s Retirement, POLITICALLY CORRECT 
(July 3, 2005), http://www.conservativecartoons.com/cartoon.php?toon=401. 
 8. See, e.g., Brandon L. Bartels, The Sources and Consequences of Polari-
zation in the U.S. Supreme Court, in AMERICAN GRIDLOCK 171 (James A. 
Thurber & Antoine Yoshinaka eds., 2015) (characterizing the swing voter as a 
powerful dictator on the Court); Editorial, Supreme Sandra, AZ CENT. (July 3, 
2003), http://archive.azcentral.com/specials/special47/articles/0703thur1-03 
.html (calling O’Connor “Supreme Sandra” and “the single most powerful 
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things further, there is sometimes a conflation between the 
electoral swing voter and the judicial swing voter, failing to 
separate the two as applied to the different branches of gov-
ernment.9 Most recently, another strain of confusion has 
emerged thanks to scholarship showing that swing Justice and 
median Justice may not always align, even though the two 
terms are often used interchangeably.10 
This plethora of uses demonstrates that there is a multi-
layered and widespread confusion about what “swing” actually 
means when applied to a Supreme Court Justice. In light of the 
enormous importance the actors defined by these terms play in 
shaping and defining the differences between law, politics, and 
society in America, it is perhaps surprising to learn that schol-
ars have yet to trace the etymology of these terms.11 This gap in 
existing scholarly literature is problematic: swing Justices are 
among the most important and mythic figures in American le-
gal and political life, and yet it is not entirely clear what this 
title actually conveys. Thus, a thorough analysis of swing vot-
er’s various meanings, its origin, and historical use is long 
overdue. 
 
woman in America”). For more positive or neutral depictions of Kennedy see, 
for example, Richard L. Hasen, Op-Ed, A Court of One: Anthony Kennedy, L.A. 
TIMES (June 30, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-oe-0702-hasen 
-kennedy-court-20150630-story.html; Matt Purple, The “Swing Vote” on the 
Supreme Court Is Actually a Libertarian, RARE (June 26, 2015), http://rare.us/ 
story/the-swing-vote-on-the-supreme-court-is-actually-a-libertarian; see also 
Patrick D. Schmidt & David A. Yalof, The “Swing Voter” Revisited: Justice An-
thony Kennedy and the First Amendment Right of Free Speech, 57 POL. RES. Q. 
209 (2004) (proposing an expanded conception of swing voting using Kennedy 
as the prime example for study). 
 9. The electoral swing voter is the topic of a 2008 flop film featuring Kev-
in Costner as the determining vote in a presidential election. SWING VOTE 
(Touchstone Pictures 2008); see also infra Part I.B.2. 
 10. See Peter K. Enns & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, The Swing Justice, 75 J. 
POL. 1089, 1090 (2013) (“While this justice will often be pivotal, the term-
specific median justice does not always cast the fifth majority or deciding 
vote.”); see also H. Roger Segelken, What Moves the Supreme Court’s ‘Swing’ 
Justices, CORNELL CHRON. (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.news.cornell.edu/ 
stories/2013/10/what-moves-supreme-court-s-swing-justices (proposing the 
“swing Justice” casting the pivotal vote is not always the median of the Court). 
 11. The law-politics distinction “presupposes an unduly stringent separa-
tion between professional reason and popular values. . . . [It] is both real and 
suffused with ambiguity and uncertainty.” Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, 
Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Ac-
tion, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1473, 1474 
(2007). 
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Against this background, this Note seeks to deepen our 
understanding of the origins and various uses of the term 
swing voter as applied to Supreme Court Justices. By detailing 
swing voter’s etymological history and transformation in legal 
and non-legal contexts, this Note acknowledges that swing vot-
er’s meaning is not as straightforward as initially assumed, es-
pecially when the term is employed in the Supreme Court con-
text. By deploying an etymological analysis and intellectual 
history, crucial tools in helping us understand and apply con-
tested concepts and meanings, this Note seeks to discover (or 
perhaps reclaim) the true meaning of “swing voter” and “swing 
Justice” as it relates to Supreme Court Justices.12 To accom-
plish this goal, Part I begins by tracing the history of “swing 
voter” back to its origins in the term swingman, connecting the 
terms and mapping their transition into well-known de-
scriptors for particular Supreme Court Justices. Part II identi-
fies and examines five individual examples of Justices histori-
cally identified as swing voters, swing Justices, or median 
Justices in an effort to show why each Justice fits a different 
iteration of the swing voter mold.13 Part III explains the norma-
tive implications of this failure to define what it means to be a 
swing voter, swing Justice, or median Justice, including con-
ceptual confusion for academics from several disciplines who 
use all the terms to describe the same or different Justices; 
public confusion about what a swing Justice actually is; and the 
lack of a true distinction between law and politics. 
I.  FROM SWINGMAN TO SWING VOTER: MAPPING THE 
CONVERGENCE OF THE TERMS AS DESCRIPTORS FOR 
JUSTICES ON THE SUPREME COURT   
To fully understand the present day definition of swing 
voter, it is necessary to map out the evolution of the term from 
its origins as “swingman” all the way to its many uses today, 
where it is now often used interchangeably with “median Jus-
tice.” Section A tracks the history of the term swingman, with 
its eclectic assortment of uses, attempting to pinpoint its vari-
 
 12. For an amusing contemporary explanation of why etymologies are im-
portant with examples, see Cristina Gusano, An Introduction to Etymology: 
Eight Great Word Origins, BABBEL, https://www.babbel.com/en/magazine/an 
-introduction-to-etymology-eight-great-word-origins (last visited Nov. 28, 
2016). 
 13. Swing voter only recently ballooned in popular discourse. Thus, the 
examples weigh heavily toward the Court’s contemporary eras. 
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ous definitions over time. Section B hones in on the use of 
swingman in reference to specific members of the Court, and 
discusses, somewhat speculatively, the conversion of swingman 
to swing voter in that context. 
A. THE SWINGMAN: FROM RANCHES AND RAILROADS TO THE 
RULE OF LAW 
The precise origins of the word swingman are unclear. It 
initially appeared sometime around the start of the twentieth 
century—irregularly at first and then increasing progressively 
over time. Regrettably, very little material exists that appears 
to accurately trace the development of the term. Nonetheless, 
some evidence makes it possible to trace its origin and evolu-
tion. Subsection 1 discusses the multiple dictionary definitions 
of swingman over time in combination with examples from me-
dia of the period. Subsection 2 discusses swingman’s earliest 
uses in reference to Supreme Court Justices. 
1. Uses and Connotations Referenced in Dictionary 
Definitions14 
In 1903, the first documented use of swingman, or “swing-
men” in this instance, emerged in The Log of a Cowboy, to ref-
erence cowboys who would ride on the outskirts of a cattle herd, 
known as “flank rider[s],” and guide lost cattle back to the 
group.15 Swingman is sometimes written as “swing man”; yet, 
there does not appear to be any drastic difference in meaning 
due to spacing.16 As the word increased in popularity, it also be-
came a commonplace descriptor for gifted male jazz musicians 
 
 14. See, e.g., Swingman, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1919) 
[hereinafter OXFORD]. Dictionaries often lag behind popular culture in the 
adoption of words. See Geoffrey Clive Williams, Art for Dictionaries’ Sake: 
Comparing Cultural Outlooks Through Dictionaries and Corpora, in ENGLISH 
DICTIONARIES AS CULTURAL MINES 175 (Roberta Facchinetti ed., 2012) (“[T]he 
senses found in a dictionary are not necessarily those that predominate in cur-
rent usage.”). Dictionaries are “much better on range and variation than on 
connection and interaction.” RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY 
OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY 19 (1983). Because of this, dictionary definitions are 
not always the best resources to identify and evaluate evolving terms. 
 15. ANDY ADAMS, THE LOG OF A COWBOY 25 (1903) (“The main body of the 
herd trailed along behind the leaders . . . guarded by outriders, known as 
swing men.” (emphasis added)); see also PHILIP ASHTON ROLLINS, THE COW-
BOY: HIS CHARACTERISTICS, HIS EQUIPMENT, AND HIS PART IN THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE WEST 253 (1922). 
 16. See, e.g., JOHN PITT, USA BY RAIL: PLUS CANADA’S MAIN ROUTES 289 
(8th ed. 2012) (illustrating that both swingman and “swing man” were used to 
describe the third brakeman on the railroad). 
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who played swing music, popular from about 1935 to 1946.17 
These men were admired in their communities and honored for 
their lively musical talent and performance abilities.18 During 
the latter portion of this time period, the media began to use 
swingman to describe active government leaders who aspired to 
achieve certain goals or obtain specific positions as well as 
those that “maintain[ed] a fair balance between different points 
of view.”19 In 1944, swingman was also employed in the aviation 
context to describe a “jack of all trades.”20 
Beginning in the late 1960s, the “jack of all trades” defini-
tion might have led to the use of swingman as slang for multi-
faceted players in sports, describing a man adept in multiple 
positions.21 The swingman in sports was the most versatile man 
on the court, field, course, or in the ring.22 Swingman has al-
ways been an inherently gendered term, used primarily to de-
 
 17. See RAY B. BROWNE & PAT BROWNE, THE GUIDE TO UNITED STATES 
POPULAR CULTURE 333 (2001).  
 18. See, e.g., Biography, BENNY GOODMAN: THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE 
KING OF SWING, http://www.bennygoodman.com/about/biography.html (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2016); see also Angelynn Grant, The Golden Age of Jazz Co-
vers, ANGELYNN GRANT DESIGN, http://angelynngrant.com/the-golden-age-of 
-jazz-covers-the-golden-age-of-jazz-covers (last visited Nov. 28, 2016) (quoting 
James Flora describing Benny Goodman as “one of the great ones as a swing 
man” (emphasis added)). 
 19. Paul M. Herzog, Dean at Harvard; Headed N.L.R.B. Under Truman, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1986, at D27 [hereinafter Herzog]; see, e.g., Robert C. Al-
bright, Michigan Leader Sets Sights on Two Main Senate Posts, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 18, 1946, at 1. 
 20. William W. Prescott, Accepted: One Fortress, FLYING, Dec. 1944, at 50, 
51. 
 21. See Phil Elderkin, Knicks Playoff Material?: Playoff Basketball 
Stallworth ‘Swingman’ Free Ride Offers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 22, 
1965, at 13; Thomas Faces Joe’s Guns: Minnesota Farmer Opposes Louis in 
Title Bout Tonight, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1938, at A13 (using swingman in box-
ing context). Following the evolution to the present day in the sports context, 
swingman appeared in a few other random places in the 1970s: in literature to 
describe individuals involved in the drug trade, particularly drug dealers, and 
to define emerging revolutionary leaders in Latin American coup d’états. See 
JOHN WAINWRIGHT, HIGH-CLASS KILL 157 (1973) (“Tell us about the dope he 
pushed . . . . He was taking from his swingman.” (emphasis added)); see also 
Martin C. Needler, Military Intervention in Latin America, in THE MILITARY 
AND MODERNIZATION 89–90 (Henry Bienen ed., 2009). 
 22. This remains the case today. See Andrew Capel, Good News for Ade-
laide as Versatile Swingman Andy Otten Nears Return, HERALD SUN (June 28, 
2015), http://www.heraldsun.com.au/sport/afl/teams/adelaide/good-news-for 
-adelaide-as-versatile-swingman-andy-otten-nears-return/news-story/6f1852b0 
20fbc0d1b55c30edf6b9d173; Rusty Simmons, Versatile Swingman Iguodala ‘A 
Step Ahead of Everybody,’ SF GATE (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.sfgate.com/ 
warriors/article/versatile-swingman-iguodala-a-step-ahead-of-6205212.php. 
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scribe men of athletic achievement and ability.23 Today, this use 
of swingman is still the most common, if not its sole use.24 
Despite dictionaries’ extensive chronicling of uses for 
swingman across decades, they fail to mention one of swing-
man’s most subtly relevant uses for the purposes of this Note: 
the title for a third brakeman on a railroad car.25 Overall, the 
imagery of such a position on the railroad was positive. The 
railroad swingman played an essential role in keeping train 
travel safe.26 The swingman’s purpose was to keep the railroad 
functional.27 He played an important role in the maintenance 
and healthy operations of the system as a whole.28 Foreshadow-
ing the swingman’s role on the Supreme Court, the swingmen 
of the railroads mediated feuds between the conductor and en-
gineer.29 This understanding of the swingman—as an interme-
diary between two potentially opposing parties—seems to be 
applicable more generally to situations that arise on commit-
tees, boards, and most importantly, appellate benches.30 
 
 23. See supra notes 21–22. 
 24. Swingman is the name of a popular Nike baseball collection. See Aus-
tin Boykins, Swing for the Fences with the Nike Swingman Collection, 
SNEAKERWATCH (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.sneakerwatch.com/article/029796/ 
swing-for-the-fences-with-the-nike-swingman-collection. Swingman is most 
often used to describe versatile basketball players. See, e.g., James Herbert, 
Report: Blazers, Veteran Swingman Mike Miller Agree on a Buyout, CBS 
SPORTS (Sept. 27, 2015), http://www.cbssports.com/nba/eye-on-basketball/ 
25319053/report-blazers-mike-miller-agree-on-a-buyout. 
 25. See PITT, supra note 16. Several solicitations for male railway work-
ers, including swingmen, are listed in the classifieds of the early years of this 
period. See, e.g., Classified Ad 22, CHI. DAILY TRIB., May 4, 1945, at 32; see al-
so Classified Ad 5, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1944. 
 26. In 1949, the Supreme Court itself addressed the role of a swingman on 
the railroad in Carter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Railway. Co., 338 U.S. 
430, 431 (1949). 
 27. See Rrboomer, Comment to What is a “Swingman,” What is His Job, 
and Why Did He Ride the Roof?, CLASSIC TRAINS MAG. (Nov. 11, 2011, 4:25 
PM), http://cs.trains.com/ctr/f/3/t/198874.aspx (explaining the role of a swing-
man); see also Negro Rail Firemen Lose on Job Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 
1960, at 7 (discussing a discrimination controversy involving the swingman 
position); Sparks from the Rail: Winston’s Spicy Gossip of Men and Events in 
the Railroad World, CHI. DEFENDER, Apr. 26, 1913, at 7 (publicizing Mr. John 
Fite’s new role as “swing man”). 
 28. See Rrboomer, supra note 27. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See, e.g., Robert Doherty, Court Gives Approval to Morse Pact: 6 to 5 
Management Edge Possible, CHI. DAILY TRIB., May 17, 1957, at C9; Herzog, 
supra note 19; Laura A. Kiernan, McGowan Is Named Chief Appeals Judge, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1981, at F1. 
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2. Earliest Mentions of the Swingman on the Supreme Court 
The search for the first use of swingman in the judicial 
context is imperfect, and there is a possibility that earlier uses 
exist.31 Yet, based on near duplicate prints of an article by 
newspaper reporter Frank R. Kent, it is clear that the swing-
man in the Supreme Court context appeared as early as 1937.32 
Each version of Kent’s article identifies Justice Owen Roberts 
as the Justice “in the position of ‘swing man’ upon whose whim 
all decisions depend” because he was the fifth vote in West 
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, a decision more infamous for its under-
lying political implications than for its holding.33 Some histori-
ans recount Roberts’ vote in Parrish as a strategic politically 
motivated switch in support of New Deal legislation and a de-
parture from his previously conservative voting choices.34 These 
historians speculate that Roberts swung his vote to deliberately 
prevent President Roosevelt’s threat to add more Justices to 
the Supreme Court from coming to fruition.35 
Kent’s article only identifies a swingman in a single deci-
sion. The first use of swingman to describe the overall decision-
making style and impact of a specific Justice, however, ap-
peared later in a January 1947 issue of Fortune magazine.36 
The article, written by Arthur Schlesinger, classifies the mem-
bers of the Supreme Court based on their individual beliefs.37 
Sandwiched between Schlesinger’s “judicial activists” and 
“champions of self-restraint,” are two Justices, Chief Justice 
Fred Vinson and Justice Stanley Reed, who Schlesinger de-
scribes as the “balance of power.”38 Although both men are ap-
parently the “balance of power,” only Reed is labeled as the 
 
 31. Some newspapers from earlier decades remaining offline, and search 
engines provide only limited additional resources. Further research may lead 
to even earlier uses. 
 32. Frank R. Kent, The Great Game of Politics, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1937, 
at 4 [hereinafter Great Game I ]; Frank R. Kent, The Great Game of Politics: 
“Their Reluctance Increased,” WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1937, at 4 [hereinafter 
Great Game II ]. 
 33. 300 U.S. 379, 398–400 (1937) (emphasis added) (upholding Washing-
ton’s minimum wage law); Great Game I, supra note 32; Great Game II, supra 
note 32. 
 34. E.g., Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save 
Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 69, 70–71 (2010). 
 35. See id. President Roosevelt based his threat on public discontent with 
the perceived splitting and stalemating of the Court. 
 36. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Supreme Court: 1947, FORTUNE, Jan. 
1947, at 73. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 74–78. 
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“swing.”39 Schlesinger writes that Reed’s “position as swing 
man makes him the object of special solicitude on the part of 
his brethren as well as of the lawyers before the court.”40 To 
color Reed’s characterization as the swingman, Schlesinger also 
describes him as the “center of the ideological controversy” and 
“the key man.”41 
Only two years later, swingman appeared even more prom-
inently in a 1949 Stanford Law Review article that questioned 
the characterization, role, and impact of Justice Reed.42 The au-
thor sought to “present a limited analysis of the common view 
that [Reed was] the swing man on the present Supreme 
Court.”43 Reed’s central position in defining the majority for 
specific kinds of labor and trade regulation cases likely prompt-
ed this swingman analysis.44 The author questions Reed’s gen-
eralized role as the swingman, basing this judgment on the 
sway of Reed’s votes in cases addressing specific issues versus 
his decision-making practices as a whole.45 This article, which 
focused on an overall analysis of Reed’s voting practices and 
emphasized his collective voting pattern, compared to Kent’s 
discussion of Roberts’ singular “swing” vote in Parrish, solidi-
fied Reed as the first officially labeled swingman of the Su-
preme Court.  
B. FROM SWINGMAN TO SWING VOTER 
The transition from swingman to swing voter is murky 
and, at times, confusing.46 Subsection 1 begins with a survey of 
legal, political, and layman’s dictionaries in search of clues as 
to when swingman evolved to swing voter. Subsection 2 ad-
dresses the development of the term swing voter as a descriptor 
for a subset of voters in the general populace. 
 
 39. Id. at 78. This raises questions as to whether the Chief Justice can ev-
er be the swingman. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Mr. Justice Reed—Swing Man or Not?, 1 STAN. L. REV. 714 (1949) 
[hereinafter Mr. Justice Reed]. 
 43. Id. at 715. 
 44. See id. at 728; see, e.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 
495 (1948). 
 45. Mr. Justice Reed, supra note 42, at 728–29. 
 46. Swingman/Swing Voter, YURI DOLGOPOLOV, A DICTIONARY OF CON-
FUSABLE PHRASES: MORE THAN 10,000 IDIOMS AND COLLOCATIONS 311 (2010). 
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1. The Legal, Political, and Layman’s Definitions 
Swingman’s general definition listed in both the Oxford 
English Dictionary47 and Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary lack 
reference to swingman’s use in the judicial context entirely.48 
Surprisingly, Merriam-Webster does not have a separate entry 
for swing voter, but merely recognizes the term as a derivative 
of the word “swing.”49 Additionally, the Oxford English Diction-
ary acknowledges swing voter’s use in contexts outside of the 
polling electorate only in passing, providing “also, a casting 
voter” as an alternative definition.50 On the other hand, legal 
and political dictionaries merely contain the definition for 
“swing vote(r),” leaving swingman entirely absent from their 
pages.51 
In the legal realm, “swing vote” appeared as an entry in 
the second edition of A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage in 
1995.52 Even then, the single definition it did provide applies 
solely to the term’s use in the judicial context: “An appellate 
judge’s vote that determines an issue on which the other judges 
are evenly split.”53 A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage offers 
O’Connor as an example of a swing voter, citing a 1989 
Newsweek article.54 Black’s Law Dictionary provided a defini-
tion for swing vote for the first time in 1999, implicitly suggest-
ing that the phrase may have been considered slang up until 
that time.55 Political dictionaries seem to have a similar lag 
time.56 The length of this lag was actually quite long since 
 
 47. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 48. See Swingman, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th 
ed. 2003) [hereinafter MERRIAM] (“A player capable of playing effectively in 
two different positions and esp. of playing both guard and forward on a bas-
ketball team.”); see also OXFORD, supra note 14. 
 49. But, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary does contain an entry for swing-
man. See MERRIAM, supra note 48. 
 50. OXFORD, supra note 14. 
 51. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999); GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF 
LEGAL USAGE (3d ed. 2011); KATHLEEN THOMPSON HILL & GERALD N. HILL, 
REAL LIFE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT THEY’RE SAYING AND 
WHAT IT REALLY MEANS 267–68 (1994). 
 52. Swing Vote, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE (2d ed. 1995). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id.; see also George Hackett & Ann McDaniel, All Eyes on Justice 
O’Connor, NEWSWEEK, May 1, 1989, at 34. 
 55. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 51 (“Swing vote. The vote that 
determines an issue when all other voting parties, such as appellate judges, 
are evenly split.”). 
 56. See HILL & HILL, supra note 51 (publishing an edition with a “swing 
vote” entry in 1994). 
MCGAVER_MLR 1/25/2017  8:06 PM 
2017] SWING VOTER ON THE SUPREME COURT 1257 
 
swing voter appeared nearly three decades earlier in a 1966 is-
sue of The Economist, describing a legislative committee mem-
ber’s voting patterns.57 Simultaneously, swingman solidified it-
self in the sports world and its other meanings lost cultural 
relevance.58 This left swing voter to eventually become the 
commonplace descriptor for influential voters in the electorate 
and pivotal Justices on the Supreme Court, finally appearing in 
legal dictionaries after decades of use in popular discourse.59 
2. Distinguishing the Electoral Swing Voter 
Unlike swingman, which has had its definitions pared 
down to a sole use in the sports context, swing voter has con-
sistently retained two popular uses in the electoral and judicial 
contexts.60 Swing voter is often used to define particular blocs of 
the electorate, typically an independent or floating voter that 
might not be tied to a political party.61 At first glance, the use of 
swing voter in the electoral context would seem to be closely 
connected to the use of swing voter in reference to the Supreme 
Court. Yet, somewhat surprisingly, the use of swing voter to 
describe a group in the electorate likely originated inde-
pendently of its judicial counterpart.62 
Political parties of the eighteenth century asked the public 
to vote for their “ticket.”63 In the late nineteenth century, the 
idea of a “split ticket” enticed certain voters “across party 
 
 57. Feeling for the Brake, ECONOMIST, Mar. 5, 1966, at 898, 898 (“He is 
expected to join Mr. Daane as a ‘swing voter,’ leaving Mr. Martin with only 
one conservative colleague . . . .”). 
 58. See MERRIAM, supra note 48. 
 59. Swing music faded in popularity and the rise of automobiles and 
planes made train travel less common, leading to the waning relevance of the 
swingman in these contexts and in public conversation. See The Decline of Rail 
Travel: Three Decades of Turmoil, AMERICANRAILS.COM, http://www.american 
-rails.com/decline.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2016); Swing, NEW WORLD ENCY-
CLOPEDIA, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/swing (last modified 
Nov. 9, 2015). 
 60. Although there are documented uses of swingman in the electoral con-
text, it is now essentially obsolete in this context. See, e.g., Electoral Sabotage, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1960, at A14 (“Southern states may bid for a swing-man 
role in the presidential election.”). 
 61. See generally LINDA KILLIAN, THE SWING VOTE: THE UNTAPPED POW-
ER OF INDEPENDENTS (2012) (examining the role of independent and swing 
voters in modern elections). 
 62. See DAVID K. BARNHART & ALLAN A. METCALF, AMERICA IN SO MANY 
WORDS: WORDS THAT HAVE SHAPED AMERICA 260 (1997). 
 63. Id. (entire word capitalized in original source); see also Ticket, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) (“A list of can-
didates for nomination or election.”). 
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lines.”64 But, it was not until the 1964 presidential election that 
the moderate voters who emerged out of the Republican Party 
and elected Lyndon B. Johnson to the presidency were referred 
to as a “swing voter” bloc.65 Electoral swing voters have been 
described as “ambivalent” or “cross-pressured.”66 Typically the 
target of study for political strategists in presidential cam-
paigns, swing voters “are especially concentrated in swing 
states.”67 Swing states are a relatively recent and distinct phe-
nomenon, first heavily discussed in media reports covering the 
2000 presidential election.68 Just as swing voter is used inter-
changeably, despite the term’s different connotations, swing 
state is (arguably, inconsistently) equated with battleground 
states, bellwethers, or in reference to states where polls suggest 
competitive elections.69 
As the driving force in presidential elections, swing voters 
create swing states.70 Swing voters within a state are identified 
 
 64. BARNART & METCALF, supra note 62; see also Split Ticket, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) (“A ballot cast by a voter 
who votes for candidates of more than one party.”). 
 65. BARNART & METCALF, supra note 62, at 260–61. Some scholars have 
connected the use of the term in the electorate to the simultaneous use of 
“swing,” or more accurately “swinger,” as a descriptor for people who switch 
sexual partners. Id. at 261 (“Perhaps there was a hint of sexiness in being a 
swing voter, even if not a swinging one.”). The act of engaging in “group sex” or 
“mate swapping” is known as “swinging.” LAWRENCE R. SAMUEL, SEXIDEMIC: 
A CULTURAL HISTORY OF SEX IN AMERICA 96 (2013); see also GILBERT D. 
BARTELL, GROUP SEX: A SCIENTIST’S EYEWITNESS REPORT ON THE AMERICAN 
WAY OF SWINGING (1971) (researching the unique sexual practices of “swing-
ers” in the 1960s). 
 66. WILLIAM G. MAYER, THE SWING VOTER IN AMERICAN POLITICS 2 
(2008). 
 67. Stacy Hunter Hecht & David Schultz, Introduction: Swing States and 
Presidential Elections, in PRESIDENTIAL SWING STATES: WHY ONLY TEN MAT-
TER xxi (Stacy Hunter Hecht & David Schultz eds., 2015) (citing LINDA 
KILLIAN, THE UNTAPPED POWER OF INDEPENDENTS (2011)); see also Gerald F. 
Seib, Who Will Be the Swing Voters in 2016?, WALL ST. J. (May 25, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/who-will-be-the-swing-voters-in-2016-1432574507. 
 68. Hecht & Schultz, supra note 67, at xiii; see also Darshan J. Goux, The 
Battleground State: Conceptualizing Geographic Contestation in American 
Presidential Elections, 1960-2004, at 17 (Spring 2010) (unpublished Ph.D dis-
sertation, Univ. Cal. Berkeley), http://eprints.org/uc/item/8dp32778 (stating 
that swing state was mentioned as early as 1936 four times in the New York 
Times but increased in popularity only in recent years). 
 69. See Hecht & Schultz, supra note 67, at xiv, xvi (“[I]t is clear from these 
few definitions, as well as others provided by journalists and pop culture ref-
erences, the concept swing state is not precisely defined.”); see also ALEX 
THOMSON, A GLOSSARY OF U.S. POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 168 (2007) (defin-
ing swing state as a state with no dominant political party). 
 70. See KILLIAN, supra note 61, at 17 (noting that when swing voters re-
MCGAVER_MLR 1/25/2017  8:06 PM 
2017] SWING VOTER ON THE SUPREME COURT 1259 
 
and defined by demographics.71 Thus, significant alterations in 
the demographics of a region make or break a swing state.72 
But, demographics are just the beginning to a more in-depth 
analysis involving ideology, socioeconomic variables, and even 
the median voter theorem.73 The rhetoric in this context is in-
tense and complicated, but the most intriguing aspect is how 
identical it is to the rhetoric about swing voters on the Supreme 
Court.74 This simultaneous use begs an analysis of the implica-
tions for the Supreme Court, and more broadly, the rule of law. 
C. SWING VOTER, SWING JUSTICE, AND MEDIAN JUSTICE 
Prior to identifying and discussing specific Justices, this 
Note seeks to consider the application of the median voter theo-
rem to the Supreme Court, known as the median Justice theo-
rem,75 and how that application interacts with the use of swing 
voter and swing Justice. 
The median Justice is “the Justice in the middle of a dis-
tribution of Justices.”76 This is a spin on the median voter theo-
rem.77 The theorem posits that the median Justice of the Court 
“controls the content” of majority opinions.78 
 
side in a state that also oscillates between Democrat and Republican, the 
swing voters are particularly important). 
 71. See, e.g., Wesley McCune, Farmers in Politics, 319 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. SOC. SCI. 41, 42 (1958) (“The farm vote as a whole is a swing vote, chang-
ing relatively easily . . . .”). 
 72. See AMERICA’S NEW SWING REGION: CHANGING POLITICS AND DE-
MOGRAPHICS IN THE MOUNTAIN WEST 147 (Ruy Teixeira ed., 2012). 
 73. See Hecht & Schultz, supra note 67, at xxiii–iv (detailing methods in-
cluding asking about feelings toward the two parties, actual voting in presi-
dential elections, and demographic variables). 
 74. See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 66, at 20 (“[I]t is the swing voter who con-
trols the balance of power in elections.”). 
 75. Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the United States Su-
preme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1277 (2005) (“Social scientists . . . tend to 
use . . . the ‘median’ Justice, that is, the Justice in the middle of a distribution 
of Justices, such that (in an ideological distribution, for example) half the Jus-
tices are to the right of (more ‘conservative’ than) the median and half are to 
the left of (more ‘liberal’ than) the median.”). 
 76. Id. 
 77. For an introduction to how median voter theorem is applied to the Su-
preme Court, see VANESSA A. BAIRD, ANSWERING THE CALL OF THE COURT: 
HOW JUSTICES AND LITIGANTS SET THE SUPREME COURT AGENDA 152–55 
(2007); Martin et al., supra note 75, at 1280–83 (detailing the role of the medi-
an Justice in the voting patterns of Justices in sex discrimination cases). 
 78. See generally Cliff Carrubba et al., Who Controls the Content of Su-
preme Court Opinions?, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 400 (2012). 
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Since the method of identifying the median Justice is more 
than a bit ambiguous, legal commentators and researchers 
alike have attempted to identify the median Justice using a 
plethora of descriptors including the “center of the Court,” the 
Court’s “middle,” the “swing” Justice, the “pivotal” Justice, and 
“the most powerful Justice.”79 Although most social scientists 
tend to exclusively use the term “median” to identify the crucial 
Justice,80 confusion remains as other social and political scien-
tists, commentators, researchers, advocates, and even members 
of Congress equate the swing Justice with the median Justice.81 
This equation imports all sorts of assumptions that simply do 
not track the historic use of either term and perpetuates the 
improper use of swing voter in such a context, leading to fur-
ther obfuscation of all three terms and their modern uses. 
There are several kinds of pivotal Justices on the Supreme 
Court. Whether a Justice is described as a swing voter, swing 
Justice, or median Justice carries differing implications. These 
words designate very specific kinds of actors, serving various 
purposes and inhabiting different roles on the Court. Concep-
tually, the median Justice is a phenomenon of social and politi-
cal science, rooted in a foundation of statistical voting patterns 
and placement on an ideological spectrum. On the other hand, 
the swing Justice is typically unpredictable, not easily cabined 
by a standard voting pattern or ideological label. Further, 
swing voter is continually, and perhaps inappropriately, em-
ployed in the Supreme Court context when there is a strong ar-
gument that it should be relegated only to its electoral uses. 
One Justice can certainly carry all of these labels and inhabit 
all of these roles at one or several times; however, the distinc-
tions are important and imply very different things about who 
a Justice is on the bench. 
 
 79. Martin et al., supra note 75. 
 80. See id.; see also Bernard Grofman & Timothy J. Brazill, Identifying 
the Median Justice on the Supreme Court Through Multidimensional Scaling: 
Analysis of “Natural Courts” 1953–1991, 112 PUB. CHOICE 55, 57 (2002) (stat-
ing their intention to identify the Court’s median). 
 81. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 37, 44–45 (describing how the term “median Justice” is used in both pub-
lic and congressional discourse). 
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II.  WHO IS A SWING VOTER, SWING JUSTICE, OR 
MEDIAN JUSTICE AND WHY?   
The confines of this Note only allow for a thorough analysis 
of five Justices typically identified as swing voters, or some it-
eration thereof. When thinking about which Justices are la-
beled as such, the connotations have repeatedly shifted to take 
on new meanings, depending on the Justice, time period, and 
intended use of the descriptor. This Part uses five Justices as 
illustrative case studies, showing how the use of swing voter, or 
some iteration thereof, to define each Justice fails to capture all 
of the nuances of each Justice’s individual characterization. 
The use of one term to describe each of these five Justices fails 
to encapsulate who each Justice was and how they did their 
work on the bench. 
Section A analyzes the characterization of Reed as the first 
identified swingman in the late 1940s, translating to a modern 
mixture of both the swing Justice and the median Justice. Sec-
tion B focuses on the characterization of the “moderate” median 
Justices of the 1970s, White and Powell. Section C addresses a 
portion of O’Connor’s tenure from 1993 to 2005, when she 
served as the first female swing voter on the Court. Section D 
brings the analysis into the present with Kennedy, the modern 
swing Justice from 2005 to present day. 
A. JUSTICE STANLEY REED: THE FIRST SWINGMAN 
This Section discusses Reed’s characterization as the first 
Supreme Court swingman within the developing legal and po-
litical setting of the late 1940s, translating into a combination 
of swing Justice and median Justice. Reed is identified as the 
first swingman instead of Owen Roberts because of Reed’s con-
sistent characterization over an extended period of time, in-
stead of just in a singular case.82 It is important to contextual-
ize Reed’s characterization within the social and political 
movements of the time period. Thus, Subsection 1 will provide 
a brief description to set the scene within which Reed emerged 
as the first swingman of the Court. Subsection 2 will then ex-
plain that being a swingman meant, embodying attributes of 
both the Supreme Court swing Justice and median Justice 
roles, depending on the issue at hand and under the influence 
of social change and theory feuds. 
 
 82. See infra Part I.A.2. 
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1. The New Deal with the Supreme Court 
In the early days of the republic, the Supreme Court 
worked internally to develop decision-making norms and exter-
nally to establish the judiciary’s role in American society. Chief 
Justice John Marshall played a primary role in shaping each of 
these pursuits.83 Perhaps the most cogent example of this is 
Marbury v. Madison, the unanimous 1803 decision establishing 
judicial review.84 As Chief Justice, Marshall nearly singlehand-
edly pushed his colleagues to unanimity in the interests of na-
tionalizing the law, strengthening the powers of the federal ju-
diciary, and setting precedents for future Courts.85 
During the Lochner-era (1897–1937), the Supreme Court 
employed foundational practices laid down by Marshall to 
emerge as the institution charged with upholding the rule of 
law as a concept over and above politics.86 The Court depicted 
the law as a last legal monument, preventing socialism from 
destroying democracy, capitalism, and liberal legal thought.87 
Simultaneously, the Progressive Movement (1890–1920) 
brought about state-administered socialist structures as a re-
hearsal for the New Deal.88 Progressivism, as a legal and politi-
 
 83. See KENT R. NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY 72 
(1985) (describing Marshall as a “quiet statesm[a]n”). 
 84. 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing judicial review under Article III of the 
United States Constitution). 
 85. See NEWMYER, supra note 83, at 79 (discussing the “working unity of 
the Court” and the Marshall Court’s “firm nationalist determination to expand 
the powers of Congress”). The Marshall Court looked, interacted, and operated 
quite differently than the Supreme Court of 2017. Today’s Justices no longer 
live in a boardinghouse; there are nine Justices instead of six, three of whom 
are women; and the racial composition is more varied. The Current Court, THE 
SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://supremecourthistory.org/history 
-of-the-court (last visited Nov. 28, 2016). Compared to the Marshall Court, 
however, present-day unanimous opinions or “opinions of the Court” are rare. 
See, e.g., Stat Pack for the October Term 2014: Unanimity, SCOTUSBLOG STAT 
PACK 19 (June 30, 2015), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/07/SB_Stat_Pack__OT14.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2016) (providing sta-
tistics of different types of unanimity in the October 2014 term). 
 86. The Lochner-era began with the Supreme Court’s decision in Allgeyer 
v. Lousiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) and ended with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Par-
rish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). During this time period, the Supreme Court used 
substantive due process to strike down many laws, acting like a board of cen-
sors in some sense. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 87. But see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DE-
MOCRACY 232–302 (1942) (positing that the “intellectual class” will fundamen-
tally contribute to capitalism’s demise by appointing politicians and judges 
that are not good administrators). 
 88. E.g., Progressivism and the Wisconsin Idea, WISCONSIN HISTORICAL 
SOCIETY, http://www.wisconsinhistory.org/turningpoints/tp-036/?action=more_ 
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cal movement, pushed on the neutrality of the rule of law and 
its independence as a legal perspective.89 It specifically chal-
lenged the bias of the rule of law’s human administrators, in-
cluding judges, lawyers, clerks, and their elite viewpoints.90 
A feud erupted over the law-politics distinction, spear-
headed by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and the legal real-
ists.91 Legal realism is a school of thought that challenges the 
idea that legal reasoning is separate and autonomous from pol-
itics and society.92 Roosevelt’s New Deal and its ensuing litiga-
tion engaged the legal realist philosophy by actively taking le-
gal concepts, operationalizing them, and dealing with the law 
pragmatically by substantially involving the federal govern-
ment in the economy.93 In 1937, towards the end of New Deal 
implementation, the Court struggled to maintain a unified ap-
pearance and externalized its divisiveness.94 In response, Roo-
 
essay (last visited Nov. 28, 2016); see Thomas G. West & William A. 
Schambra, The Progressive Movement and the Transformation of American 
Politics, HERITAGE (July 18, 2007), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/ 
2007/07/the-progressive-movement-and-the-transformation-of-american 
-politics (“Progressivism was a reform movement that ran from the late 19th 
century through the first decades of the 20th century . . . .”). 
 89. See JOHN D. BLUENKER ET AL., PROGRESSIVISM 3–21 (1986). 
 90. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 10 (1963) (“There is 
no hypocrisy. The lawyers’ pretenses are not consciously deceptive. The law-
yers, themselves, like the laymen, fail to recognize fully the essentially plastic 
and mutable character of law.”); see also TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE 
MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW 
CLERK 206–12 (2006) (providing a brief history of the role and relationship of 
law clerks to the Supreme Court). 
 91. Holmes and his fellow legal realists acted as iconoclast reformers, at-
tacking the cherished law-politics distinction. Jerome Frank, a famous legal 
realist, criticized “the basic legal myth” of “the Father-as-Infallible-Judge,” 
proposing that the “desire [for] certainty in law is to indulge in a childhood 
fantasy.” Neil Duxbury, Jerome Frank and the Legacy of Legal Realism, 18 
J.L. & SOC’Y 175, 182 (1991) (quoting FRANK, supra note 90, at 19); see also 
ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER: JEROME FRANK’S 
IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAW 129–63 (1985) (examining Frank’s legal realism on 
the bench). For more information on the life and legacy of Holmes, see G. 
EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER 
SELF (1993). 
 92. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 
1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 193 (1992). 
 93. See The Progressive Era’s Legacy: FDR’s New Deal, DISCOVER THE 
NETWORKS, http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/viewSubCategory.asp?id= 
1228 (last visited Nov. 28, 2016) (mentioning FDR’s dictator-like power in in-
stituting economic programs during the Great Depression). 
 94. See Samuel D. Thurman, Jr., The Coming Test of the Supreme Court, 
22 J. ST. B. CAL. 21, 21 (1947) (“The present [Vinson] court . . . [is] the most 
badly divided court in American history.”). 
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sevelt proposed a plan to “pack the Court.”95 The plan “would 
have added a Justice to the court as sitting Justices reached 
the age of 70 without retiring.”96 This proposal prompted Rob-
erts’ infamous “switch in time [that] saved nine,” and the plan 
never made it past the Senate.97 
In 1947, ten years after the New Deal’s adoption, the Court 
was tasked with handling the influx of New Deal litigation as a 
result of poor legislative draftsmanship, even though no one 
Justice could boast more than ten years of service.98 As it over-
turned or slowly chipped away at precedents, critics accused 
the Court of lacking objectivity and weakening the doctrine of 
stare decisis.99 The external discord combined with the weak 
leadership of then-Chief Justice Vinson set the stage for the 
emergence of the Court’s first swingman, Reed.100 
2. Reed: The Court’s First Swingman 
Reed, a former government lawyer that had “vainly [ar-
gued] many of the early New Deal measures before the Su-
preme Court,” accepted President Roosevelt’s nomination in 
1938.101 The Senate rapidly confirmed his appointment.102 Reed 
was simultaneously described as occupying a “central position 
on the Bench” and as “a figure of great influence,”103 bolstering 
 
 95. JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SU-
PREME COURT 3 (2010) (addressing the context surrounding Roosevelt’s plan). 
 96. Walter Trohan, Reed Becomes Top Dissenter of High Court, CHI. DAILY 
TRIB., June 12, 1955, at 34. 
 97. SHESOL, supra note 95, at 434 (alteration in original); id. at 429–43 
(narrating the aftermath of Supreme Court decisions regarding the Wagner 
Act and their impact on Roosevelt); see also infra Part I.A.2. 
 98. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, THE WARREN COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, 
AND LEGACY 4 (2001) (noting the large amount of legislation and its “sloppy” 
quality); Thurman, supra note 94, at 32 (commenting that one-hundred per-
cent of the Justices were appointed in the last ten years). 
 99. See Thurman, supra note 94, at 22. 
 100. See UROFSKY, supra note 98, at 29 (“A weak chief . . . Frederick M. 
Vinson—can often find himself stymied . . . and end up doing little more than 
presiding over a judicial battlefield.”). 
 101. See id. at 32; Thurman, supra note 94, at 32. 
 102. Senate Quickly Confirms Reed Nomination: New Justice Is Expected 
To Sit Next Week, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1938, at 4; see also John P. Frank, The 
Appointment of Supreme Court Justices: III, 1941 WIS. L. REV. 461, 505 (“Con-
firmation of Stanley Reed . . . was more in the nature of an accolade than an 
investigation.”). 
 103. John P. Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1947–1948, 16 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 49 (1948); see also Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Supreme Court: 
1947, FORTUNE, Jan. 1947, at 73, 78 (“Reed[’s] . . . position as swing man 
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his dual characterization as swing Justice and median Justice. 
As early as 1947, commentators identified Reed as swingman of 
the Court: “A solid moderate whose opinions have seemed more 
rooted in the case at hand than in any leanings, left or right.”104 
Reed’s “moderate” nonideological position seemed to place him 
square in the middle of the bench, much like a median Jus-
tice.105 But being swingman for Reed did not imply an active 
mediating position; rather, it meant a passive tipping of the 
scales in equally split disputes.106 This scale tipping sounds 
more like the role a swing Justice would play in any given case. 
Reed’s dual characterization displays a desire by academics and 
the public to discuss the particularities of Reed’s role, but con-
fusion about the proper way to characterize the fluidity of his 
position. Despite his seeming importance, Reed was a relatively 
inconspicuous man in most contexts.107 Nevertheless, his vote 
remained crucial in marginal cases. Between 1945 and 1950, 
the Court released 112 five-to-four/four-to-three decisions out of 
725 total opinions.108 Reed appeared in the majority in eighty-
one of these decisions, or 72.3 percent of the time.109 Whether 
Reed was playing ideological median of passive scale-tipper on 
any given case did not change the fact that his vote was unpre-
dictable and desirable to both factions on the Court. 
Notwithstanding the numbers, the generalized description 
of Reed as swingman and the lack of a precise definition for the 
term produced some doubt at the time. This prompted a study 
 
makes him the object of special solicitude on the part of brethren as well as of 
the lawyers before the Court.”). 
 104. Justice Reed Retires, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 2, 1957, at 22; see 
also Thurman, supra note 94, at 32 (“An assiduous steering of a middle course 
has made his vote most frequently the deciding one in five-to-four decisions.”). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Justice Reed Steps Down, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1957, at 19 (“During 
these turbulent years he has evolved from ardent advocate of the New Deal 
laws to one of the more conservative group on the Supreme Court bench. And, 
between times, he was ‘swing man’ of the court whose opinions in close deci-
sions would tip the scales one way or the other.”); The Spinning Spectrum, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1957, at 12 (noting many five-to-four decisions). 
 107. See Thurman, supra note 94, at 32 (“Reed [is] the least colorful mem-
ber of the group . . . .”). 
 108. The figures cited were determined using raw data compiled by THE 
SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://www.supremecourtdatabase.org/data.php 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2016). From that raw data, the author identified one-vote 
decisions, be it five-to-four or four-to-three, over the period cited. The author 
then reviewed each decision to determine whether the Justice fell within the 
majority or minority. Finally, the author compiled case-specific information so 
that the Term could be thoroughly examined. 
 109. Id. 
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of his voting patterns in particular issue areas, leading to the 
proposition that his vote was not always crucial.110 The study’s 
conclusions accurately predicted Reed’s later tendency towards 
the conservative bloc, noting his votes were “considerably more 
often” detrimental to the liberal wing’s position.111 It could also 
be the case that Reed became the Court’s swingman based on 
his voting pattern, or lack thereof, in certain types of cases, 
specifically matters involving trade regulation and labor is-
sues.112 Although some doubt may have existed about a general-
ized swingman label for Reed throughout his entire time on the 
Court, his identification as the first swingman of the Court on 
issues of trade regulation and labor between 1945 and 1950 
went unchallenged. 
As is the case with every Justice identified as pivotal, 
Reed’s identity as swingman depended entirely on an equal 
split amongst his brethren. Whether Reed embodied the char-
acteristics of a swing Justice or median Justice at any given 
point was meaningless without a four-to-four split between the 
other Justices. Without an equal division, Reed’s vote would be 
no more remarkable than that of any other Justice. 
B. JUSTICE BYRON WHITE AND JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL: THE 
MEDIAN JUSTICES OF THE 1970S 
This Section explores the identification of White and Pow-
ell as swing voters in the 1970s, since each man was identified 
as a pivotal player on the Burger Court.113 Subsection 1 contex-
tualizes the characterizations of both Justices within the 
broader framework of the resurgence of the idea of an objective 
rule of law and its continued tension with the legal realist 
movement. Subsection 2 posits the question whether White and 
Powell occupied the ideological middle of the Court or simply 
adhered to an unchanging individualized judicial philosophy.114 
 
 110. See Mr. Justice Reed, supra note 42, at 729 (suggesting that future 
statistical work should assess if Reed’s vote truly was crucial). 
 111. Id. at 719, 722. 
 112. See id. at 728; see also Robert C. Barnard & Sergei S. Zlinkoff, Pa-
tents, Procedure and the Sherman Act—The Supreme Court and a Competitive 
Economy, 1947 Term, 17 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 n.6 (1948) (providing a table 
of opinions broken down by Justice in trade regulation cases in the 1947 
Term). 
 113. For background on the Burger Court, see TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, 
THE BURGER COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 3 (2000). 
 114. See Lance Liebman, Swing Man on the Supreme Court: The Court Is 
in Two Factions Now and Justice White Is in the Middle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 
1972, at SM17; see also Linda Greenhouse, Byron R. White, Longtime Justice 
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Regardless, based on the public perceptions and actual statis-
tics of decision-making during the majority of their terms, 
White and Powell’s roles as swingmen make them look more 
like median Justices than swing Justices. 
1. The Resurgence of the Rule of Law 
President Eisenhower nominated Earl Warren for Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court in 1953.115 Often compared to 
John Marshall, the “Superchief” was known for his unique 
“ethicist” approach to controversy.116 When Burger succeeded 
Warren as Chief Justice in 1969, this approach, perceived by 
some as judicial activism, produced a belated backlash to legal 
realism.117 This backlash birthed an “extremist” version of legal 
realism: adhering to the maxim that “all law is politics” instead 
of the earlier Holmes and Frank version that “all law is poli-
cy.”118 Critics, spurred by perceptions of the judiciary’s un-
chained policymaking, advocated for a return to objectivity, the 
rule of law, and neutrality in judicial decision-making.119 
Burger valued the formalities of the Court over its more 
pragmatic functions.120 This leadership style, however, alienat-
ed other Justices and stifled the potential for a compromising, 
collegial, and united Court.121 This is illustrated by the fact that 
Justice Potter Stewart felt estranged enough to provide inside 
information about the Court and Burger to outsiders, resulting 
in The Brethren.122 Burger’s favoritism for appearances and in-
 
and a Football Legend, Dies at 84, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2002), http://www 
.nytimes.com/2002/04/16/us/byron-r-white-longtime-justice-and-a-football 
-legend-dies-at-84.html?pagewanted=all (quoting former clerk, Kate Stith 
Cabranes, in discussing the change in ideology of the Court while “Byron 
White didn’t change”). 
 115. See G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 129–58 (1982) 
(detailing the nomination). 
 116. UROFSKY, supra note 98, at 34, 35; see also WHITE, supra note 115, at 
369 (“He . . . act[ed] . . . from his instincts for what was fair, honorable, politi-
cally feasible and sensible at the time.”). 
 117. Calvin Woodard, Whose Law Is It?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 1990), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/1990/09/09/books/whose-law-is-it.html?pagewanted=all 
(book review). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. 
 120. Formalities meant the rituals, appearances, and administration of the 
Court. See YARBROUGH, supra note 113, at 232. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See generally BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: 
INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1979) (detailing an insider’s perspective of the 
Supreme Court’s operation and decision-making processes). 
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stitutional rituals did nothing to preserve the Court’s image as 
the rule of law’s objective gatekeeper. In fact, under Burger’s 
leadership, the Court’s image seemed far more political than 
impartial. 
The 1970s brought about a slew of socially divisive issues, 
including the Vietnam War,123 the Pentagon Papers,124 the 
death penalty,125 and abortion.126 In 1972, following the nomina-
tions of Lewis F. Powell and William H. Rehnquist, President 
Nixon opined that the Court was “as balanced as [he] had an 
opportunity to make it.”127 Naturally, Nixon’s perception of bal-
ance was skewed by his political ideology. This blatant attempt 
by a President to manipulate the Court echoed back to the in-
teractions between Roosevelt and the split Court of 1937.128 Be-
cause of Nixon’s interference, the Justices of the Burger Court 
frequently found themselves positioned in opposing blocs: the 
four Nixon appointees in opposition to the four “survivors of the 
Warren Court.”129 White, an appointee of President John F. 
Kennedy, played a pivotal role in equally split cases, oftentimes 
making a majority of five.130 Along with White, Powell also 
emerged as a pivotal voter when he established himself as a 
moderate on the Court. Powell’s tenure exceeded White’s and 
continued into the 1970s, also arguably increasing his im-
portance in divided cases. Both White and Powell, in their re-
spective roles as ideological medians, were wedged between op-
posing factions on the Court with their comparatively moderate 
perspectives. 
 
 123. See, e.g., Sarnoff v. Shultz, 409 U.S. 929, 929–30 (1972) (denying certi-
orari due to the political nature of the request to review financial disburse-
ments for the Vietnam War). 
 124. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 628–29 (1972); N.Y. 
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (deciding issues regard-
ing the release of the Pentagon Papers). 
 125. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 126. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton 410 U.S. 179, 185–86 (1973) (holding that a 
right to abortion is rooted in the constitutional right to privacy); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (expanding on this right). 
 127. James J. Kilpatrick, Nixon Court: On Its Way, TUSCALOOSA NEWS, Ju-
ly 20, 1972, at 3. 
 128. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 129. John P. MacKenzie, Justice White Swing Man in Nixon’s ‘Balanced’ 
Court, WASH. POST, July 3, 1972, at A2. In 1972, the four Nixon appointees 
were Blackmun, Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist. The four Warren Court sur-
vivors were Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart. 
 130. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Branzburg v. Hayes, 
408 U.S. 665 (1972); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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2. The 1970s’ “Moderate” Medians131 
As a 1946 law clerk to Vinson during Reed’s time as 
swingman, Byron White came to the Court without a distinct 
ideological label.132 A median Justice on the bench, White was 
also a celebrated swingman on the football field, baseball dia-
mond, and basketball court.133 In this role, “White’s strengths 
and weaknesses as a judge echoed his talents as an athlete.”134 
Throughout his career, White maintained a belief that a 
“[J]ustice’s job was to decide particular cases rather than advo-
cate and pursue an overarching constitutional vision.”135 With 
this mantra, he oftentimes became the pivotal vote in close cas-
es.136 Serving on the Court for over three decades, White’s peak 
as median Justice distinctly spiked between 1971 and 1973.137 
During this time, out of the Court’s 539 decisions, 86 were five-
to-four or four-to-three decisions; White appeared in the majori-
ty in 62 of those 86 decisions.138 This amounted to being in the 
majority of split cases 72.1 percent of the time.139 
The 1972 Court had two factions, and “Justice White [was] 
in the middle.”140 Oftentimes stuck between the Nixon appoin-
 
 131. But see William B. Schultz & Philip K. Howard, The Myth of Swing 
Voting: An Analysis of Voting Patterns on the Supreme Court, 50 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 798, 800 (1975) (“Justice White and Powell . . . aligned themselves with 
members of the right voting bloc rather than acting as swing voters between 
the blocs. Only Justice Stewart was a true swing voter in the aggregate of cas-
es.”). Schultz and Howard demonstrate the dangers of conflating median Jus-
tice, swing Justice, and swing voter. Both Justices White and Powell could 
have been median Justices on the Court while Stewart simultaneously played 
the role of swing voter. 
 132. See PEPPERS, supra note 90, at 138–39 (describing White’s accolades 
without mentioning any ideological orientation); Greenhouse, supra note 114 
(“[N]o ideological label ever fit White comfortably.”). 
 133. See YARBROUGH, supra note 113, at 67. White competitively played 
pick-up basketball with his clerks in the Court’s gym, nicknamed the “highest 
court in the land.” WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 122, at 65–66. For a 
photograph of such, see PEPPERS, supra note 90, at 78. 
 134. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Athlete as Judge, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 505 
(1999) (reviewing DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO WAS ONCE WHIZZER 
WHITE (1998)). 
 135. DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., THE REHNQUIST COURT: UNDERSTANDING ITS 
IMPACT AND LEGACY 38 (2007). 
 136. See From Triple Threat to the Bench, TIME, Apr. 6, 1962, at 24 (dis-
cussing White’s relationship with the Kennedys, which led to federal judge-
ship). 
 137. See YARBROUGH, supra note 113, at 67 (“[White’s] tenure extended 
from 1962 until his retirement in 1993.”). 
 138. See supra note 108. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Liebman, supra note 114. 
MCGAVER_MLR 1/25/2017  8:06 PM 
1270 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1247 
 
tees and Warren Court survivors, White maintained his label-
less existence.141 Preferring narrow decisions tied closely to the 
facts, his judicial record is more easily examined by issue than 
in general terms.142 White’s individualized judicial philosophy 
and decision-making practices failed to fit neatly into any pre-
determined box, particularly because his decisions were not 
considered “politically reliable.”143 To some, this suggested the 
makings “of a new centrist faction and a new set of Court 
themes.”144 Yet, White’s portrayal as the “unpredictable ‘swing’” 
of the Court was not only inaccurate if distinguishing the terms 
appropriately within context, but also implied that his ideology 
arbitrarily swung. In reality, “there [was] nothing wishywashy 
about Justice White.”145 
In the split opinions of 1972, White voted “with the con-
servatives more often than not” with some notable exceptions, 
including nullification of the death penalty, wiretapping, and 
representation for indigent defendants.146 Did White encompass 
the ideological middle of the Court or did he have an independ-
ent judicial philosophy? The answer to this question seems to 
be both. Not surprisingly, which Justice fits the ideological 
middle of the Court depends upon the changing ideologies of 
those to his left and right, sometimes pushing Stewart into the 
median Justice role during this time period as well.147 Yet, 
White’s judicial philosophy and values remained consistent 
over time.148 Thus, the changing face of the Court combined 
with White’s unchanging mantra determined when and how 
White found himself in the median Justice seat. As late as 
 
 141. See John Kamps, There’s Still No Label for Justice White, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 13, 1972, at M7 (“White has shown no partisan political tendencies since 
he joined the [C]ourt.”). 
 142. See YARBROUGH, supra note 113, at 68. 
 143. Ayers, supra note 7 (explaining the conservative/liberal split on the 
Court and White’s unpredictability). 
 144. Liebman, supra note 114, at SM94. 
 145. Ayers, supra note 7. 
 146. Kamps, supra note 141, at M6. 
 147. See Janet L. Blasecki, Justice Lewis F. Powell: Swing Voter or 
Staunch Conservative?, 52 J. POL. 530, 539–40 (1990) (discussing the 1972–
1974 bloc shifting of Powell, Stewart, and White); Ruth Marcus, White Be-
comes High Court’s Key Vote, WASH. POST, June 25, 1990, at A4 (noting that 
the addition of Scalia, Kennedy, and O’Connor positioned White in the mid-
dle). 
 148. See generally Dennis J. Hutchinson, Two Cheers for Judicial Re-
straint: Justice White and the Role of the Supreme Court, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1409 (2003) (providing a review of Justice White’s opinions to support testi-
monials of his judicial restraint). 
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1990, commentators continued to dub White a “key vote.”149 But 
if you asked White’s former law clerk, Lance Liebman, he 
would say, “If you’re there a long time, you know these things 
come and go.”150 
In 1971, as he was simultaneously appointed to the Court 
with then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist, most people 
expected Powell to side with the Nixon bloc of the Court.151 His 
appointment was part of Nixon’s continuing attempt to “stack 
the Court.”152 Yet, as time passed, Powell’s allegiance to the 
Nixon appointees arguably decreased, and his identification as 
a moderate median Justice solidified.153 Powell’s depiction was 
overwhelmingly positive, described as a “balancer” and amelio-
rator of conflict.154 Some critics claimed that designating Powell 
as the swing voter makes generalizations without reliable 
quantitative support.155 Yet, these critics make the mistake of 
assuming that being the median Justice, occupying a critical 
role on the Court, receiving the swingman label, and being the 
swing voter all mean the same thing. These critics nonetheless 
continued to claim that Powell’s characterization was based 
more “on a common sense view of judicial voting behavior” than 
on empirical analysis.156 
The compiled figures do lend credence to this empirical 
criticism since Powell has a much lower percentage in five-to-
four/four-to-three majorities when compared to other median 
Justices and swing Justices.157 Out of the 651 total decisions be-
 
 149. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 147. 
 150. Id. 
 151. President Reagan made a successful dual nomination again in 1986, 
promoting Associate Justice Rehnquist to Chief Justice and placing Justice 
Antonin Scalia on the Court. See HUDSON, supra note 135, at 29. 
 152. Fred P. Graham, A Shift in the Center of Power, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 
1972, at E10. 
 153. But see Schultz & Howard, supra note 131 (questioning this “decreas-
ing allegiance” as occurring in but a few types of cases and arguing that Pow-
ell most often voted with the Nixon bloc). When asked if “he would describe 
himself as a moderate, Powell replied, ‘I don’t characterize myself any way.’” 
Glen Elsasser & Janet Cawley, Powell Quits Supreme Court, CHI. TRIB., June 
27, 1987, at 1. 
 154. Blasecki, supra note 147, at 530; see also Stuart Taylor, Jr., Justice 
Powell Shaping Law as Swing Man on High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1987, 
at 1 (describing Justice Powell “as the man in the middle of the Supreme 
Court’s ideological divide”). 
 155. See Blasecki, supra note 147, at 532 (“Powell voted with the majority 
in almost three-fourths of the Court’s 5-4 decisions (118 out of 161).” (quoting 
Paul W. Kahn)). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Compare supra note 139 and accompanying text, with supra note 109 
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tween 1976 and 1979, Justice Powell appeared in the majority 
in 53 of the 90 five-to-four/four-to-three decisions.158 This meant 
that in split decisions, Powell was in the majority only 59.9 
percent of the time.159 Nevertheless, a common-sense view 
would not weaken the impact the public label has on Powell’s 
decision-making legacy as a moderate in the middle. This is es-
pecially true given Powell’s pivotal vote in seminal First 
Amendment cases, jury verdicts in criminal cases, affirmative 
action, and gay rights.160 Powell’s most notable decision as the 
median Justice was in 1978’s Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia v. Bakke.161 Powell’s compromising view upheld affirma-
tive action programs for minorities but struck down an admis-
sions program at the University of California Medical School 
under federal civil rights law.162 Like White, Powell’s most 
common characterization as median Justice pinned him as the 
philosophical middle of the Court, regardless of whether that 
was empirically true or not.163 
 
and accompanying text, and infra note 202 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra note 108. Note that Powell recused himself in one five-to-
four case in both 1977 and 1979. 
 159. See supra note 108. 
 160. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195–96 (1986) (holding 
that a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy was constitutional); Regents of 
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319–20 (1978) (holding racial quotas 
in admissions decisions unconstitutional, but also holding that race could be a 
factor in the admissions process); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707–09 
(1972) (holding that the First Amendment does not allow reporters to conceal 
the criminal activities of their confidential sources when responding to a grand 
jury subpoena); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 412–13 (1972) (holding that 
the Sixth Amendment does not require unanimity in a state jury trial); John-
son v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 378–79 (1972) (holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not require unanimity in a state jury trial). 
 161. 438 U.S. 265. 
 162. See id.; see also J.F. terHorst, The Court Makes Itself Hard To Under-
stand . . ., L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1978, at D5 (“They split 5 to 4 on each of them, 
with Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. serving as swingman in each instance—for 
admitting Bakke to the UC Davis medical school, against the use of racial quo-
tas, but for the rule that race may be considered in weighing an applicant’s 
qualifications.”); No One Lost: Swing Man Swung the Court, with Something 
for All, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1978, at E1 (stating that the Court found affirma-
tive action programs constitutional but strict quotas unconstitutional, with 
Justice Powell serving as the “swing man” on both issues). 
 163. See Al Kamen, Powell Acts as Court Majority-Maker: Virginian Is 
Swing Vote on Divided Bench, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 1985, at A1 (“But if Justic-
es were arrayed by philosophy, Powell would sit exactly in the middle.”); see 
also Taylor, supra note 154 (describing Justice Powell “as the man in the mid-
dle of the Supreme Court’s ideological divide”). 
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C. JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR: THE FEMALE SWING 
VOTER 
This Section discusses Sandra Day O’Connor as the first 
female swing voter on the Supreme Court. Subsection 1 contex-
tualizes the conversation within the increased perception of 
Court polarization. Subsection 2 seeks to emphasize the total 
disappearance of swingman to describe pivotal actors on the 
Court to the gender-neutral swing voter (eventually swing Jus-
tice) descriptor while explaining why O’Connor is most accu-
rately portrayed as a swing voter. 
1. An Era of Increasing Polarization 
As part of his campaign platform for the 1980 presidential 
election, Ronald Reagan declared that he would appoint the 
first female Supreme Court Justice.164 In 1981, Reagan held 
true to his word and appointed O’Connor.165 O’Connor spent the 
majority of her tenure as a member of the Rehnquist Court.166 
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist made unanimity a goal and 
is regarded as a better leader than his predecessor, Burger,167 
“[c]ritics . . . excoriated the Court for departing from precedent 
and for adhering too closely to it; for exercising too little activ-
ism and too little restraint; for being too result oriented and not 
cognizant enough of the effects of its decisions.”168 
Later in O’Connor’s tenure, American government began to 
show signs of increased political polarization.169 The Supreme 
Court was no exception, leading the oftentimes outspoken 
O’Connor to express concern about the political extremism and 
polarizing “undertow dragging the Court into politics.”170 This 
 
 164. See HUDSON, supra note 135, at 43. 
 165. See Ed Magnuson et al., The Brethren’s First Sister, TIME, July 20, 
1981, at 10. O’Connor asserted herself as the “FWOTSC.” Sandra Day 
O’Connor, Letter to the Editor, High Court’s ‘9 Men’ Were a Surprise to One, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 1983), http://www.nytimes.com/1983/10/12/opinion/l-high 
-court-s-9-men-were-a-surprise-to-one-225413.html. 
 166. Rehnquist served from 1986 to 2005. See HUDSON, supra note 135, at 
35. 
 167. See id. at 27–29 (“Burger was not . . . effective as a leader of the 
[C]ourt.”). 
 168. Id. at xii. 
 169. See generally Political Polarization, PEW RES. CTR., http://www 
.pewresearch.org/packages/political-polarization (last visited Nov. 28, 2016) 
(describing the increasing gap between liberals and conservatives, Republi-
cans and Democrats). 
 170. TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 204; see also NANCY MAVEETY, JUSTICE 
SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR: STRATEGIST ON THE SUPREME COURT 131 (1996) 
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polarization and O’Connor’s role on the Court is best explained 
through an example of arguably one of the most politically 
charged decisions the Court has ever made, Bush v. Gore.171 
The majority of five, including Kennedy, Thomas, 
Rehnquist, Scalia, and O’Connor, drafted the opinion that effec-
tively decided the 2000 presidential election.172 This majority 
faced heavy criticism. Scholars accused the Justices of deciding 
based upon the “personal identity and political affiliation of the 
litigants.”173 Additionally, several Justices encountered accusa-
tions of ethical violations in failing to recuse themselves from 
the decision.174 Specifically, O’Connor and her husband alleged-
ly made statements that a Gore victory would be a “personal 
disaster” and would prevent her retirement, prompting a flood 
of articles.175 Ultimately, the Court’s increasing separation di-
rected cases “to a single [J]ustice—O’Connor.”176 Commentators 
and litigants alike focused their attention to the “O’Connor 
Court,” recognizing its fracture and resorting themselves to un-
stable predictions of O’Connor’s vote.177 
2. The Obvious Swing Voter 
Based on the events surrounding Bush v. Gore alone,178 
O’Connor is easily typecast as the swing voter. While her first 
few years and overall voting behavior on the Court can be de-
 
(“[T]he Rehnquist Court . . . has suffered from a jurisprudential polarization.”). 
 171. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 7 (“[T]he Rehnquist 
Court—the Court of Bush v. Gore—dwelled in the center of American political 
life.”). But see Michael C. Dorf, Is There a Distinction Between Law and Poli-
tics? Yes, and the Bush v. Gore Decision Proves It, FINDLAW (Dec. 27, 2000), 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20001227.html. 
 172. See 554 Law Professors Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2001, at A7. 
 173. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT 
HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 at 174 (2001). But see generally Ronald D. Rotunda, 
Yet Another Article on Bush v. Gore, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 283 (2003) (responding 
to arguments that the Justices decided the case based on their political prefer-
ences, not precedent). 
 174. In addition to O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas also faced ac-
cusations. See generally Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Bush 
v. Gore: Did Some Justices Vote Illegally?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 375 (2003) 
(discussing the accusations against each Justice in depth). 
 175. TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 142–44; Neumann, supra note 174, at 375–
78, 377 n.8. 
 176. TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 204. 
 177. Jeffrey Rosen, A Majority of One, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 3, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/03/magazine/a-majority-of-one.html; Op-Ed, 
The O’Connor Court, WASH. POST (July 2, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost 
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/01/AR2005070101835.html. 
 178. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
MCGAVER_MLR 1/25/2017  8:06 PM 
2017] SWING VOTER ON THE SUPREME COURT 1275 
 
scribed as conservative, her decision-making practices bothered 
many who expected her to be more consistent and predictable 
in that respect.179 Between 1993 and 2005, “more than a quar-
ter of all Time and Newsweek articles discussing O’Connor la-
beled her as a swing voter.”180 This appears to be the most regu-
lar use of swing voter to describe any one Justice on the Court 
up to that point. 
During those twelve years spanning 1077 opinions, 
O’Connor voted in the majority in 155 of the 544 five-to-four de-
cisions, or 69.9 percent of the time.181 Her method of assessing 
the potential public reaction prior to acting gave her immense 
power and encapsulated her swing Justice role.182 This involved 
a close tethering of her rulings “to what most people wanted or 
at least would accept.”183 She typically favored malleable stand-
ards over bright-line rules.184 Her preferred style of “pragma-
tism in service of principle” supplemented that power by bal-
ancing interests on a case-by-case basis.185 Yet, O’Connor’s 
perceived power threatened critics of her substantive decisions 
who derided the female swing Justice for “legislating from the 
bench.”186 
 
 179. See Robert E. Riggs, Justice O’Connor: A First Term Appraisal, 1983 
BYU L. REV. 1, 15; see also TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 58–59, 206–07 (providing 
examples of the internal and external criticism of O’Connor’s unexpected devi-
ation from conservatism). 
 180. Abigail Perkiss, A Look Back at Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s Court 
Legacy, NAT’L CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY (July 1, 2016), http://blog 
.constitutioncenter.org/2016/07/a-look-back-at-justice-sandra-day-oconnors 
-court-legacy. As early as 1990, media outlets recognized O’Connor as a “criti-
cal ‘swing’ vote.” Stephen Wermiel, Sandra Day O’Connor Emerges as Key 
Player in High Court Rulings, WALL ST. J., June 11, 1990, at A1. 
 181. The figures cited are taken from the Harvard Law Review’s 1982–
2006 surveys of the preceding Supreme Court Term. For a general explanation 
of how the statistics are compiled, see The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—The 
Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 415–19 (2005). See also supra note 108. 
 182. See Michael D. Lemonick & Viveca Novak, The Power Broker, TIME, 
July 11, 2005, at 30. 
 183. TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 7. O’Connor is also seen as a strong propo-
nent of judicial independence, which seems to be in conflict with her practice 
of taking the public temperature on issues. See Va McLean, Reflections of a 
Retired Justice; Sandra Day O’Connor Says Judicial Independence Is Imper-
iled and Electing Judges Is Not Wise. The Immigration Debate? Spanish Was 
Her Grandmother’s First Language, USA TODAY, June 8, 2006, at A21. 
 184. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 
(1992) (holding the “undue burden” standard as the test for abortion). 
 185. Craig Joyce, Afterword: Lazy B and the Nation’s Court: Pragmatism in 
Service of Principle, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1257, 1271 (2006). 
 186. TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 225; see also Dahlia Lithwick, A High Court 
of One: The Role of the “Swing Voter” in the 2002 Term, in A YEAR AT THE SU-
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O’Connor’s role as swing Justice led her to be courted, so to 
speak, by the eight male Justices eager to mold her “persuada-
ble mind.”187 In this manner, she rose to a position of perceived 
influence, claiming to pursue centrism and moderation as not 
only a judicial but also a political philosophy.188 Deemed “Su-
preme Sandra,” O’Connor’s “open mind” made her the “single 
most powerful woman in America.”189 Nonetheless, O’Connor 
did not embrace the swing voter label.190 One theory for this 
lack of acceptance is that swing Justice was used more like an 
insult when applied to her rather than as a descriptor.191 Por-
trayals of O’Connor’s assertion of power on the Court are rid-
dled with sexism, influencing her characterization in both aca-
demia and the media. This is an apparent reflection of “a 
history of obstacles for women,” as even pieces meant to praise 
O’Connor’s accomplishments and unique position are rife with 
gendered language, sexist connotations, and innuendos.192 In 
this context, swing voter was probably meant to be more of a 
slight to O’Connor than a compliment to individuality. 
 
PREME COURT 13, 15 (Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas eds., 2004) (“The 
outcry about O’Connor’s disproportionate influence is sometimes conflated 
with a resentment of the way she decides cases.”). 
 187. Charles Lane, Courting O’Connor: Why the Chief Justice Isn’t the 
Chief Justice, WASH. POST, July 4, 2004, at W10. The term “courting” implies 
something more like dating than an analysis of a Justice’s judicial decision-
making. A simple Google search produces results solely related to dating in a 
romantic context. GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/#q=courting (Google search 
for “courting”) (last visited Nov. 28, 2016). Swing voters in the electorate are 
also often described as “persuadable.” See, e.g., Nate Silver, Swing Voters and 
Elastic States, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 21, 2012), http://fivethirtyeight.com/ 
features/swing-voters-and-elastic-states; Ruy Teixeira, Why There Are Many 
More Swing Voters than You Think, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 11, 2012), https:// 
newrepublic.com/article/102612/election-swing-voters-campaign-2012. 
 188. See TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 7. 
 189. See Supreme Sandra, supra note 8. 
 190. JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY 
OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 177 
(2007) (“O’Connor repeatedly insisted she wasn’t the deciding vote, but just 
one of nine.”). 
 191. See Susan Gluck Mezey, Gender and the Federal Judiciary, in GEN-
DER AND AMERICAN POLITICS: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 
229–32 (Sue Tolleson-Rinehart & Jyl L. Josephson eds., 2005). 
 192. Id. (“O’Connor wound up on the highest court in the land instead of 
the typing pool because she rejected both limitations and victimhood. (Another 
good lesson for the young of both genders.)”); see, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 2 
(characterizing O’Connor as “a bit of a tease”). For a more in-depth critique of 
the portrayals of women in leadership positions, see MISS REPRESENTATION 
(Girls’ Club Entertainment 2011). 
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D. JUSTICE ANTHONY KENNEDY: THE MODERN SWING JUSTICE 
This Section seeks to explore Kennedy’s depiction as the 
Court’s current swing Justice, prompting an influx of public in-
terest and criticism. Subsection 1 supports Kennedy’s swing 
Justice characterization with a discussion of his unpredictable 
decision-making style, harkening back to Matt Bors’ cartoon.193 
Subsection 2 provides the context for this modern characteriza-
tion, previewing the implications that centuries of undefined 
use has had on the Supreme Court, academics, the public, and 
even the rule of law. 
1. The Troublesome Swing Justice194 
A fellow Reagan appointee, Kennedy joined O’Connor on 
the bench in 1988.195 The two at times shared or exchanged the 
swing Justice label until O’Connor stepped down in July 
2005.196 With O’Connor gone, Kennedy established himself as a 
different kind of swing Justice, one creating more publicized 
worry than O’Connor.197 In fact, his position on issues such as 
capital punishment and use of foreign law in opinions encour-
aged conservative leaders to call for his impeachment.198 Just as 
O’Connor shook the Court as the obvious female swing voter, 
Kennedy represents a similarly provocative figure. 
Kennedy does not consider himself a swing Justice, stating 
that there is “a connotation of inconsistency, of change, but I 
think it’s just the opposite. I think it’s the cases that change, 
not the law.”199 As an initial “moderate conservative,” Kennedy 
agreed with Rehnquist in ninety-three percent of the cases de-
 
 193. See Bors, supra note 1. 
 194. Even Kennedy cannot grasp a tangible definition of swing voter. See 
Marcia Coyle, Justice Anthony Kennedy Loathes the Term ‘Swing Vote,’ NAT’L 
L.J. (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202740827841/ 
Justice-Anthony-Kennedy-Loathes-the-Term-Swing-Vote?slreturn=201601292 
33646 (“And if you want to get on the wrong side of Kennedy, call him the high 
[C]ourt’s ‘swing vote.’ ‘I hate that term,’ he said. ‘I get this visual image of spa-
tial gyrations. The cases swing; I don’t.’”). 
 195. See HUDSON, supra note 135, at 45–46 (describing the confirmation 
process that led to Justice Kennedy’s nomination). 
 196. See William Branigin et al., Supreme Court Justice O’Connor Resigns, 
WASH. POST (July 1, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2005/07/01/AR2005070101842.html (discussing Justice O’Connor’s de-
cision to resign in 2005). 
 197. See Dahlia Lithwick, Swing Time, SLATE (Jan. 17, 2006), http://www 
.slate.com/id/2134421 (“Kennedy uniquely engenders hysteria . . . .”). 
 198. See Dana Milbank, And the Verdict on Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2005, at A3. 
 199. GREENBURG, supra note 190. 
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cided while the two shared the bench.200 But, whether he be-
lieves it or not, Kennedy has been the swing Justice on the 
Roberts Court since 2005.201 Out of 770 total opinions, Kennedy 
has appeared in the majority in 140 of the 169 five-to-four deci-
sions.202 This is an impressive 82.8 percent.203 It is not Kenne-
dy’s existence as a supposedly moderate Justice that necessari-
ly raises issues, since a moderate philosophy is respected and 
has arguably existed on the Supreme Court in some form for 
decades.204 Instead, the concern is the threatening perception 
that Kennedy—a Justice “Blackmunized” in terms of his views 
on social issues—holds the power to sway decisions singularly 
as swing Justice.205 This is what makes Kennedy’s role on the 
Court, as perceived by many academics, advocates, and the 
public, problematic. 
Commentators have recently taken to the idea that it is 
Kennedy’s world, and we are just living in it.206 This proposition 
is supplemented by the fact that Kennedy “has been in the ma-
jority in virtually every notable 5–4 case.”207 After O’Connor’s 
departure, Kennedy stood “alone in the middle—and that en-
 
 200. David G. Savage, Anthony M. Kennedy and the Road Not Taken, in A 
YEAR AT THE SUPREME COURT 35, 39 (Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas eds., 
2004). 
 201. See Branigin et al., supra note 196 (discussing Justice O’Connor’s 
2005 resignation, resulting in Kennedy solely inhabiting the swing voter role). 
 202. See supra note 108.  
 203. See id. 
 204. See Lithwick, supra note 186, at 14. In fact, Kennedy’s moderate phi-
losophy has been described as “romantic,” reminiscent of the “men with grand 
visions about the role of the Court in society.” Edward Lazarus, The Pivotal 
Role of Justice Anthony Kennedy: Why the Supreme Court’s Romantic May On-
ly Become More Influential over Time, FINDLAW (Aug. 7, 2003), http://writ 
.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20030807.html; Lithwick, supra note 186, at 28. 
 205. Richard Brust, The Man in the Middle: Justice Kennedy’s Opinion in 
the Gay Rights Case Underlines His Growing Influence, 89 A.B.A. J. 24, 25 
(2003). 
 206. See Dahlia Lithwick, How the Supreme Court Justices Spent Their 
Summer Vacation, SLATE (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_ 
and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/10/supreme_court_summer_vacations_can_ 
justices_forgive_one_another.html. 
 207. Akhil Reed Amar, Comment, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Reasoning, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 145, 179 (2008); see Lani Guinier et al., The Supreme Court 
2007 Term: The Statistics, 122 HARV. L. REV. 516, 522 (2008) (showing that 
Justice Kennedy joined the majority in eight of twelve five-to-four decisions in 
the 2007 term); see also Patrick D. Schmidt & David A. Yalof, The “Swing Vot-
er” Revisited: Justice Anthony Kennedy and the First Amendment Right of Free 
Speech, 57 POL. RES. Q. 209, 209–17 (2004) (advocating for an alternative form 
of the swing voter using Kennedy as an example). 
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hances his importance.”208 Kennedy’s position potentially has 
identifiable consequences. One scholar has noted that “the fre-
quency of polarizing decisions that involve five-to-four votes 
along predictable ideological lines may contribute to the [prop-
er] public perception that the Supreme Court has become a po-
litical institution rather than a legal institution.”209 Kennedy 
represents the Court’s modern permutation of the swing Jus-
tice. He is a figure that presents a slew of questions regarding 
the implications of the perception of such a figure and the im-
plications such an actor has on the rule of law and Supreme 
Court jurisprudence more generally. 
2. The Value of Precedent 
The importance of stare decisis in the American legal sys-
tem and the preservation of the judiciary as an objective gate-
keeper of the law implies that precedent should mean some-
thing.210 The appearance, even if only an appearance, that one 
person holds the ability to dictate the maintenance or destruc-
tion of precedent is troublesome.211 In Justice Breyer’s words, 
“It is not often in law that so few have so quickly changed so 
much.”212 The decision to overturn or maintain precedents has 
obvious political consequences. This is the work of Supreme 
Court Justices. In his role as the modern swing Justice, Kenne-
dy has at times ignored stare decisis and either frustrated or 
encouraged attempts to overturn significant precedents, often-
times agonizing over the law in the process.213 
 
 208. Robert Barnes, Justice Kennedy: The Highly Influential Man in the 
Middle, WASH. POST (May 13, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/article/2007/05/12/AR2007051201586.html. 
 209. Justin Pidot, Tie Votes in the Supreme Court, 101 MINN. L. REV. 245, 
247–48 (2016). 
 210. See TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 335–36 (describing the final day of the 
2007 term in which Breyer asked, “What has happened to stare decisis?”). 
 211. See Lithwick, supra note 186, at 20. 
 212. TOOBIN, supra note 5, at 336; see also Erin Miller, Doubts About 
Death, SCOTUSBLOG (May 27, 2010, 1:30 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2010/05/doubts-about-death. 
 213. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015) (hold-
ing that marriage is a fundamental right, even for same-sex couples); Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014) (holding that a cor-
poration is a person within the meaning of the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act’s protection of a person’s exercise of religion); Citizens United v. Fed. Elec-
tion Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 371–72 (2010) (holding that limiting corporate 
contributions to political action committees infringes the First Amendment 
rights of corporations); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (hold-
ing that an anti-sodomy statute is a violation of the Due Process clause); see 
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Dahlia Lithwick, a prominent Supreme Court commenta-
tor, posits that “[t]he true paradox of swing voters is not that 
they hold more influence than their colleagues, but that the 
public believes it holds more influence over them.”214 If true, 
this proposition is troubling. But, what this writer finds even 
more troubling is the inability of academics, media, and the 
public to differentiate and identify the Court’s swing Justice 
and median Justice, particularly failing to recognize that these 
actors are not always one in the same. Yet, the failure of many 
of these same actors to distinguish the swing Justice and the 
median Justice from the swing voter, a wholly separate phe-
nomenon in American political culture, is most concerning. 
These case studies emphasize swingman, swing voter, 
swing Justice, and median Justice’s fractured use. Reed was 
labeled a swingman, but his ideology and beliefs were generally 
unknown.215 Swingman’s use as a descriptor for Reed was likely 
due to its fresh development in the Supreme Court context and 
the lack of a more solidified descriptor for who Reed was and 
how he behaved on the bench. White and Powell may not have 
been the true ideological medians of the Court, but because of 
the intense divide between the Nixon and Burger appointees, 
the most accurate descriptor for the two was as median Justic-
es.216 In her approach to cases and the law, O’Connor was more 
like an ideological median. Yet, commentators and the public 
categorized her as a swing voter, the unpredictable wild card 
wherein the dangers of the Court laid.217 This characterization 
was especially salient given the scrutiny seemingly fueled by 
sexism associated with her apparent power to singularly decide 
cases. Finally, many perceive Kennedy as extreme on the 
bench, harnessing unlimited power, not as a median Justice, 
but as a truly unpredictable swing Justice.218 But, Kennedy 
would say otherwise, maintaining that he is not a swing Justice 
at all, proposing that “[t]he cases swing; the [J]ustices don’t.”219 
 
Jeffrey Rosen, Annals of Law: The Agonizer, NEW YORKER, Nov. 11, 1996, at 
82. 
 214. Lithwick, supra note 186, at 20. 
 215. See Mr. Justice Reed, supra note 42, at 717. 
 216. See MacKenzie, supra note 129 (discussing the stark split between 
holdovers from the Warren Court and new Nixon appointees). 
 217. See, e.g., Wermiel, supra note 180 (referring to Justice O’Connor as 
the “swing vote” and detailing occasions in which she sided with the Court’s 
liberal bloc rather than her conservative colleagues). 
 218. See Coyle, supra note 194 (noting that Justice Kennedy hates his 
“swing vote” identification). 
 219. See GREENBURG, supra note 190. 
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These five examples illustrate just how haphazardly pivotal 
Justices are labeled. The terms used to describe them are em-
ployed without regard to their actual meanings, defining very 
different actors behaving in very distinct ways on the Court. 
III.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF OUR FAILURE TO 
DISTINGUISH SWING VOTER, SWING JUSTICE, AND 
MEDIAN JUSTICE   
Having established that there exists considerable confusion 
as to the meaning of swing voter and swing Justice in the con-
text of Supreme Court Justices, this Part argues that there are 
serious implications resulting from this confusion. Section A 
contends that the haphazard use of swing voter, swing Justice, 
and median Justice without consideration for the chosen term’s 
effect results in conceptual confusion for academics of several 
disciplines as well as a troubling amount of unacknowledged 
public confusion. Section B argues that the specific misuse of 
swing voter to describe actors that are more accurately de-
scribed as swing Justices and/or median Justices illustrates the 
lack of a true distinction between law and politics, admitting 
the reality of legal realism. Section C implores scholars to draw 
a sharper distinction between the median Justice and the 
swing voter and swing Justice, questioning the median Justice 
theorem’s assumptions and assessing how these assumptions 
contribute to the existing ambivalence surrounding the swing 
voter and swing Justice. 
A. HAPHAZARD TERM USAGE RESULTS IN CONCEPTUAL 
CONFUSION 
Those using the terms swing voter, swing Justice, and me-
dian Justice might benefit from increased awareness of past 
misuse and a commitment to conscious use in the future. As ev-
idenced by the case studies in Part II, academics conflate and 
confuse labels to mischaracterize Justices all too often, indis-
criminately using terms without truly understanding their un-
derlying differences. This is dangerous since a linguistic desig-
nation, especially in academia, can impact the entire conclusion 
of a study or piece of research. Lack of care when labeling Su-
preme Court Justices as swing voter, swing Justice, and/or me-
dian Justice leads to results based upon potentially faulty as-
sumptions, skewing outcomes and affecting the reliability and 
accuracy of the final product. Use of terms without a thorough 
understanding of their respective meanings leads to fundamen-
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tally inaccurate results, muddled by unacknowledged and un-
addressed assumptions. Failing to recognize these differences is 
a fundamental misstep. This failure prevents meaningful con-
versation and results in a lack of genuine understanding in any 
given discipline. Thus far, swing voter, swing Justice, and me-
dian Justice’s contextual differences have gone relatively un-
recognized, and the terms remain obfuscated and unrefined. 
In order to completely understand the implications and 
make accurate conclusions in analyses and studies of these ac-
tors, academics should consider the connotations accompanying 
terms when assigning them to various Supreme Court Justices. 
Nevertheless, the process of refining and differentiating these 
terms does not begin and end with academics. Commentators, 
advocates, and the public more generally are confused about 
the true meaning of swing voter, swing Justice, and median 
Justice too, arguably even more than academics. If academics 
do not maintain, or even acknowledge, the differences between 
various actors, how is the public expected to know and under-
stand the difference? This confusion alienates the public and 
perhaps results in deeper-set animosity towards the Supreme 
Court, other branches of government, and potentially the law 
more generally. This disconnect should be concerning since it 
upsets people’s perceptions about the value of their own role in 
democracy. A chasm so deep might even discourage the indi-
vidual faith and participation that is so crucial to the American 
system.220 
B. ROOTED IN LEGAL REALISM 
The Supreme Court’s crucial Justice matters most in close 
cases: whether it be a stable ideological median consistently 
balancing competing factions or an unpredictable wildcard 
vote.221 The confused identification of swing Justices as swing 
voters is particularly illustrative of an implication beyond mere 
confusion. It demonstrates, and perhaps even more problemat-
ic, reinforces, the distinction, or lack thereof, between law and 
politics.222 This absence of a true distinction between law and 
 
 220. See One Vote Can Make a Difference, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Apr. 7, 
2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/analysis/2015/04/07/ 
one-vote-can-make-a-difference (providing examples of local races in which one 
or two votes decided the outcome). 
 221. See Lithwick, supra note 186, at 20. 
 222. See generally THE LAW/POLITICS DISTINCTION IN CONTEMPORARY 
PUBLIC LAW ADJUDICATION (Bogdan Iancu ed., 2009) (discussing the blurry 
distinction between law and politics through a collection of works). 
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politics is a central tenet of legal realism.223 Swing voter’s sim-
ultaneous use to describe different types of actors in two inde-
pendent branches of government is concerning. The dual use of 
such a contested term is troubling because the branches of 
American government are so painstakingly separated in other 
contexts.224 
Separation of powers is at the heart of the American legal 
system. It is touted as one of the greatest achievements of mod-
ern democracy, striking a “happy mean” that “combines the en-
ergy of government with the security of private rights.”225 The 
commonplace, interchangeable use of swing voter in both the 
electoral and judicial contexts blurs this separation, failing to 
demonstrate that there are actually any real differences be-
tween the swing voter on the Supreme Court and the swing 
voter in the electorate. In fact, it complicates the apparent ex-
istence of those differences. This lack of linguistic separation 
implies a lack of actual separation. It begs questions about our 
systematic beliefs, beliefs that rely on the maintenance of the 
rule of law above the meddling world of politics and popular 
elections. If one person in either branch of government has the 
power to change the law and overturn precedent based on what 
they ate for breakfast, the implication is that stare decisis as 
an institutionalized preservation practice is all for naught: just 
part of the greater myth of the law-politics distinction.226 If the 
law-politics distinction is no distinction at all, then what really 
separates the Court from elections or legislating?227 Is judging 
really different? 
A thorough understanding of swing voter’s etymological 
history and politically charged connotations lays bare an un-
 
 223. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 224. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, art. II, art. III (detailing the separate 
powers of the three branches in American government). 
 225. William B. Gwyn, The Separation of Powers and Modern Forms of 
Democratic Government, in SEPARATION OF POWERS—DOES IT STILL WORK? 
65, 66 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1986) (quoting Alexander 
Hamilton). 
 226. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN 
AMERICAN JUSTICE 162 (1973) (“[A] trial judge, because of overeating at lunch, 
may be so somnolent in the afternoon court-session that he fails to hear an 
important item of testimony and so disregards it when deciding the case.”). 
 227. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (“The legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately depends on 
its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship. That reputation may not 
be borrowed by the political Branches to cloak their work in the neutral colors 
of judicial action.” (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 
(1989))). 
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stable reliance on the law-politics distinction. A distinction that 
has long been utilized to preserve beliefs about what distin-
guishes the judicial from the political. A distinction that exists 
when it preserves the institutional status quo but sometimes 
disappears when it would be less convenient.228 The law-politics 
distinction mystifies the rule of law, promoting the notion that 
we are ruled by law and not men. But ultimately we are ruled 
by men: the elite administrators of the law, chosen not by the 
public their decisions govern, but by the political party in pow-
er at the time of their appointment. With that understanding, 
it is clear that the law-politics distinction is nothing more than 
a bedtime story that members of the legal community tell 
themselves and the general public to cloak the political nature 
of their work. 
C. THE MEDIAN JUSTICE IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH THE SWING 
JUSTICE 
The Supreme Court swing Justice is not automatically 
synonymous with the median Justice identified by any given 
political or social science study. This dissimilarity is especially 
true when a study focuses on the general voting behavior of a 
Justice as compared to an assessment of the votes in a particu-
lar case, range of years, or topic area.229 The focus of most stud-
ies that apply the median voter theorem is on mathematical 
precision and/or game theory.230 The existing imprecision of the 
way swing voter, swing Justice, and median Justice are used in 
these studies amounts to faulty analytics, lacking important 
distinctions that can and ought to be made for clarity, coher-
ence, and sound reasoning. This is especially relevant in politi-
cal and social science research, where the results oftentimes 
depend entirely on the definition of what exactly constitutes a 
 
 228. A stark example of this institutional preservation exists in the flood of 
literature on the legacy of recently deceased Justices. This literature empha-
sizes the difference between the decaying body versus the intact legal mind. 
See, e.g., Charles Lane, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist Dies, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 4, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/ 
09/03/AR2005090301911.html; Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the 
Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html?_r=0. 
 229. Compare Mr. Justice Reed, supra note 42 (analyzing the voting behav-
ior of Reed in particular), with Grofman & Brazill, supra note 80 (performing a 
multidimensional analysis to identify the median Justices from 1953 to 1991). 
 230. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Interdisciplinary Due Diligence: The Case for 
Common Sense in the Search for the Swing Justice, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 187, 
190–92 (1996). 
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swing voter, swing Justice, or median Justice in any given con-
text. This is important to consider because the use of an un-
clear definition results in a slew of unclear conclusions. 
The existing imprecision matters because it assumes that 
there is a median on the Court who stabilizes coherent compet-
ing blocs or factions operating in the same way, issue-to-issue, 
case-to-case.231 Those scientists who adhere to the median Jus-
tice theorem contribute significantly to Supreme Court scholar-
ship.232 With that in mind, this Note proposes that the use of 
swing voter, swing Justice, and median Justice in works em-
ploying the median Justice theorem be just as technical, nu-
anced, and mathematical as the median Justice theorem itself. 
By distinguishing the median Justice linguistically and analyt-
ically from the swing voter and swing Justice, median Justice 
theorem can avoid the pervading ambiguity accompanying the 
phrases’ uses, clouded by a variety of unknown and misunder-
stood connotations. Median Justice theorem is just a piece of a 
much more complicated discourse about the voting behaviors 
and practices of the Supreme Court, one that has been insuffi-
ciently attended to and an unrecognized contributor to the con-
fusion surrounding what it really means to be labeled the Su-
preme Court swing voter. 
  CONCLUSION   
The meaning of “swing voter” is not as straightforward as 
generally assumed. Using the crucial tools of historical etymol-
ogy and intellectual history, this Note seeks to address swing 
voter’s meaning conflation, confusion, and fluctuation between 
several distinctive and contradictory definitions. These tools al-
low us to see that the implications of such meaning conflation 
are severe. 
The arbitrary use of these terms results in conceptual con-
fusion for academics and the public at large. Academic research 
is specifically affected by a sheer lack of particularity and at-
tention to detail, threatening the legitimacy and accuracy of re-
search done about these actors. In addition, this confusion 
leads to increased public alienation and overall discontent and 
lack of participation in government. The specific use of swing 
 
 231. See Mr. Justice Reed, supra note 42, at 718 (“Are there two cohesive 
four-Justice blocs?”). 
 232. See Martin et al., supra note 75, at 1278; see also Baker, supra note 
230, at 207 (“[D]oes the identity of the Court’s median or most powerful Jus-
tice matter? . . . [T]he answer is likely ‘yes.’”). 
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voter to describe what is maybe more accurately described as 
swing Justice and/or median Justice serves as an example of 
the lack of a true distinction between law and politics and fail-
ure to accurately distinguish specific terms and the actors those 
terms seek to define. Through historical etymologies and intel-
lectual histories, we might be able to better recognize, under-
stand, and apply contested concepts, like swing voter, with in-
creased awareness and clarity. 
